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During the opening stages of the Pacific War, between December 1941 and spring 1942, 
the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) appeared unstoppable. US forces in the Philippines, 
despite their efforts, could not hold out against the enemy advance, and by April, the last 
vestiges of their resistance at Bataan and Corregidor became untenable. The intelligence 
obtained during the initial encounters provided the US defense establishment with 
undeniable reasons to conclude that Japanese ground forces possessed a high level of 
tactical skill, and assessments of the IJA tended to exaggerate the latter’s capabilities.  
 
By the start of 1943, when the Allies had achieved their first victories in the Pacific 
theaters, and their counter-offensive started to gather momentum, the Americans 
developed a more optimistic view. Encounters at Guadalcanal and New Guinea proved 
that the IJA could be defeated, given adequate resources and their methods of use. 
Nevertheless, in defensive operations, enemy forces proved their skill at inflicting delay 
and casualties. The Japanese also demonstrated a propensity to fight to the last man and 
round. US intelligence therefore continued to portray the IJA as an opponent whose 
martial qualities were not to be downplayed.  
 
For the US Army and Marine Corps, the opening phases of the Pacific War taught them a 
number of valuable lessons. Military personnel were introduced to the challenges they 
were to cope with in their campaigns against the Japanese, and were also able to identify 
some of the ways to conduct successful operations against the IJA. Due attention was 
paid to the fact that the Allies were fighting an unfamiliar opponent, in battlefield 
conditions they were not yet accustomed to. The development of appropriate methods 
against the Japanese hinged upon US forces gaining adequate combat experience. 
Historiography 
The existing works on US military operations during the opening stages of the Pacific 
War provide a detailed account of the way in which the battles unfolded. The official 
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histories of the campaigns in the Philippines, Solomon islands and New Guinea have put 
forward some useful details of how the army and marine corps dealt with the challenges 
they faced.1 A number of unofficial publications have also illustrated the various lessons 
which were learned from the initial engagements with the IJA. 2  Nevertheless, the 
evolution of intelligence assessments of Japanese combat capabilities remains largely 
unexplored. A number of works have covered US views of the Japanese prior to Pearl 
Harbor, but they have not explored the way in which opinions of the IJA changed after 
the outbreak of hostilities.3 The scholarship on US army intelligence during the Pacific 
War has focused on the efforts to decode the IJA’s communications. 4  In regard to 
American attitudes towards the Japanese, John Dower’s seminal monograph illustrated 
how racial animosity acted as a key influence.5
                                                 
1 L. Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, J. Miller, Guadalcanal: the first offensive, and S. Milner, 
Victory in Papua, in series The US Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (Washington, 
DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1949-57) 
 Nevertheless, Dower tends to provide a 
one-sided account that focuses on public perceptions, and is not clear on the views held 
by military officials. The following analysis attempts to fill the gap by determining how 
American views of the IJA developed during the first year following the loss of the 
Philippines. It examines the nature of the intelligence that was available to the US 
defense establishment, its methods of scrutinizing the intelligence, and the problems 
involved in propagating a more calibrated assessment to personnel in the battlefield. Last 
but not least, one needs to explain how intelligence influenced the development of 
American tactical doctrine for ground operations. 
2 E. Bergerud, Touched With Fire: the land war in the South Pacific (NY: Penguin, 1996); R.B. 
Frank, Guadalcanal: the definitive account of the landmark battle (NY: Penguin, 1990); L. Mayo, 
Bloody Buna: the campaign that halted the Japanese invasion of Australia (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday & Co., 1947) 
3 C.L. Christman, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Craft of Strategic Assessment’, W. Murray and 
A.R. Millett (eds), Calculations, Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II (NY: Free Press, 
1992), pp.216-57; D. Kahn, ‘US Views of Germany and Japan before World War II’, E. May (ed.), 
Knowing One’s Enemies: intelligence assessment before the two world wars (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 1984), pp.476-501; also see B. Bidwell, The History of the Military Intelligence 
Division, Department of the Army General Staff, 1775-1941 (Frederick, MD: University 
Publications of America, 1986) 
4 E. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: codebreaking and the war against Japan, 1942-1945 (Lawrence, 
KA: Kansas UP, 1992); R. Lewin, The Other ULTRA: codes, cyphers and the defeat of Japan 
(London: Hutchinson, 1982) 
5 J. Dower, War Without Mercy: race and power in the Pacific War (NY: Pantheon, 1986) 
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Japanese military effectiveness during the interwar years and early 
stages of the Pacific War: a worthy match?  
One of the main reasons why US military staffs faced difficulties in assessing the IJA 
was that its tactical methods and weapons technology demonstrated an uneasy blend of 
proficiency and backwardness. Even among historians, the Japanese army’s performance 
has attracted both criticism and praise.6 On one hand, the IJA’s approach to combat was  
largely focused on the use of the infantry arm, and did not pay a great deal of attention to 
the importance of employing modern armaments. The idea was based on the experiences 
of the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese war.7 Efforts towards reform were hindered by a number 
of material and doctrinal factors. During the interwar years, officers studied British, 
French and German operations during the 1914-18 conflict, and began to explore ways to 
integrate heavy weaponry such as tanks, artillery and aircraft to their force structures.8
 
 
However, Japanese industries could not produce large quantities of equipment, and the 
IJA faced a perpetual problem in procuring an adequate supply.  
The material shortcomings were compounded by Japanese doctrine, which was based on 
the principle that foot soldiers, when properly led and motivated, could overcome 
whatever technological or numerical advantages their opponents held.9 Japan’s military 
culture also stifled initiative, and created a mindset which hindered improvements. Army 
commanders were imbued with an institutionalized taboo which discouraged them from 
suggesting that Japanese troops suffered deficiencies that could affect the prospects of 
victory. 10
                                                 
6 Following analysis is based on A.J. Barker, Japanese Army Handbook, 1939-1945 (London: Ian 
Allan, 1979); A.D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1985), 
and ‘The Effectiveness of the Japanese Military Establishment in the Second World War’, in A.R. 
Millett and W. Murray (eds), Military Effectiveness, Volume III: the Second World War, (Boston: 
Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp.1-44; E. Drea, In the Service of the Emperor: essays on the Imperial 
Japanese Army (Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1998); H.P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese 
and Allied Pacific strategies to April 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982). 
 The training of the rank and file was conducted to instill an unquestioned 
7 L.A. Humphreys, The Way of the Heavenly Sword: The Japanese Army in the 1920s (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1995), p.15 
8 Ibid., pp.79-83 
9 Drea, Service of the Emperor, p.63 
10 Coox, ‘Effectiveness of the Japanese Military’, pp.34-38 
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acceptance of orders from higher authority, and traditions demanded an adherence to set 
methods.  
 
Developments following the 1939 border clashes against the Soviets, in the Nomonhan 
region, highlighted how the IJA’s service culture obstructed innovation. The high 
command realized that its defeat against the Red Army was due to the poor state of its 
tactics and technology, but the Japanese army’s ineptitude in operating armor and 
artillery prevented it from achieving anything similar to Western standards in the 
employment of mechanized forces. 11  The solution was to augment the infantry by 
introducing a limited amount of supporting arms, but the IJA continued to overestimate 
the extent to which its forces could cope with enemies who possessed material superiority. 
Army commanders also continued to hold a condescending view of western forces, 
including the US and British.12
 
  
However, the IJA’s faults did not significantly affect its performance during the opening 
stages of the Pacific War. The Japanese defeated opponents who had a clear numerical 
superiority, and overran Southeast Asia with a mere eleven divisions.13 Japanese troops 
proved to be a tough enemy, ‘daring in the attack, and stubborn in the defense’. 14 
Because the bulk of the IJA was drawn from the peasant class, soldiers were accustomed 
to long hours of hard work, and showed a high level of endurance.15
                                                 
11 Coox, Nomonhan, pp.1009-32 
 They also held an 
exceptional level of discipline, and rarely failed to show their willingness to devote 
themselves to their nation’s cause. Last but not least, while the IJA’s equipment was 
below Western standards, infantry units managed to circumvent this weakness by 
overcoming their opponents with outflanking moves, and using light weapons such as 
rifles, hand grenades, and mortars.  
12 A.D. Coox, ‘Flawed Perception and its Effect Upon Operational Thinking: the case of the 
Japanese Army, 1937-41’, in M. Handel (ed.), Intelligence and Military Operations (London: 
Frank Cass, 1990), pp.239-54; S. Hayashi, in collaboration with A.D. Coox, Kogun: the Japanese 
Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1959), pp.23-27 
13 Willmott, Empires in the Balance, p.91 
14 Barker, Japanese Army Handbook, p.7 
15 Ibid., p.115 
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In light of the confusing mixture of strengths and weaknesses, US army officials held an 
ambivalent view of the IJA, especially prior to the Philippines invasion. The Japanese 
were recognized for having certain qualities. Within the War Department, the Military 
Intelligence Division (MID, also designated G-2) was responsible for evaluating the US 
Army’s potential rivals. The MID noted how the IJA had achieved some significant 
territorial gains during its conflict in China, and emphasized this as an indication that its 
tactical methods were sound.16
 
  
The main problem was that US army intelligence did not have an adequate system for 
disseminating information to decision-makers within the War Department. The MID was 
not authorized to advise the various services on how to use the intelligence it provided. 
Reports received from Asia, which were often written by observers who held a negative 
view of the IJA’s performance against the Chinese, were passed to the various branches 
with minimal elaboration. 17  The divisions within the War Department, including 
Operations, rarely made the effort to analyze the material supplied by G-2, because most 
of them did not have their own intelligence sections until 1940.18 As a result, military 
intelligence rarely received the ‘suitable evaluation to the point where [it] could be 
effectively translated into improvements in [American] tactics, techniques or weapons’.19
 
  
The War Department thus held a misinformed view of Japanese martial qualities. Most 
often, assessments were based on the ethnocentric notion which dictated that Western 
                                                 
16 United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA 2), RG 
226, OSS, Research and Analysis Division, Intelligence Reports, Box 18, War Department, 
Technical Manual, TM 30-480: Handbook on Japanese Military Forces, 14 May 1941. All 
documents, unless otherwise stated, were consulted at NARA 2. 
17 For examples, see RG 165, MID Correspondence Relating to Conditions in China, (M-1444), 
Roll 10, MID 2637-I-276, Report on Military Events by Military Attaché (China), 30 September 
1937, and 8 November 1938; RG 165, MID Correspondence relating to conditions in Japan, (M-
1216), Roll 25, MID 2023-1005, Captain Maxwell D. Taylor (Field Artillery), Tactical Doctrine 
of the Japanese Army, 1 April 1939 
18 W. Odom, After the Trenches: the transformation of US Army doctrine, 1919-1939 (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M UP, 1999), p.216 
19 Bidwell, Military Intelligence Division, p.267 
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forces were superior.20 In a memorandum for Secretary of War Henry Stimson, prepared 
a couple of months prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the War Plans Division (WPD) 
suggested that the IJA’s equipment was ‘inferior to that of any of the modern European 
armies’.21
 
 Nevertheless, while racial biases created false perceptions, the fact remained 
that the Japanese had only fought successfully against weaker opponents such as the 
Chinese and Russians, and had yet to prove their capability to defeat a more 
technologically advanced army. 
American army staffs also focused on the numerous problems which the IJA faced. US 
officials were correct in forecasting that the IJA was unable to defeat its Allied opponents 
in a protracted war. The WPD predicted that the ‘shortage of raw materials and 
production capacity will limit the number of new divisions which can be organized’.22 
However, prewar assessments overlooked the extent to which Allied forces would 
initially be in a weak position. According to one estimate, US forces, in cooperation with 
the British, would stop Japan ‘along the general line of Hong Kong, Luzon, and the 
Pelews’. South of this line, ‘the combined ground, air and naval forces of the Associated 
Powers’ were expected to ‘exact a tremendous toll’.23
 
 The assessment appeared to not 
acknowledge the fact that the IJA possessed the manpower and equipment needed to 
successfully execute its initial round of operations in the western Pacific.  
Insofar as US army doctrine was concerned, flawed perceptions of the IJA did not 
contribute significantly to the initial defeats in the Pacific. Instead of intelligence 
affecting tactical methods, it was usually the US army’s doctrine which shaped its 
benchmarks for gauging the IJA. A key factor which influenced army doctrine was the 
‘baptism by fire’ which western armies experienced during the First World War, which 
                                                 
20 For a parallel account of British perceptions of the IJA before the Pacific War, see J. Ferris, 
‘Worthy of Some Better Enemy?: the British estimate of the Imperial Japanese Army, and the fall 
of Singapore, 1919-1941’, Canadian Journal of History, Volume 28, No.2 (1993), pp.223-56. 
21 RG 165,  War Department, General Staff, War Plans Division, Box 109, File 3251-60, WPD 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State for War, on Strategic Concept of the Philippine Islands – 
Table A: Combat Estimate, Japan, 7 October 1941 
22 Ibid. 
23 RG 165, War Department, General Staff, WPD, Box 109, File 3251-61, Memorandum for 
General George Marshall, on Command in the Philippines, 13 October 1941 
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gave rise to a prevailing belief that future conflicts would be waged primarily through the 
use of modern equipment. Staff officers from the general service school at Fort 
Leavenworth stressed the importance of offensive action, and made repeated efforts to 
enable infantry and artillery to operate in conjunction so as to achieve breakthroughs at 
critical points along the enemy’s defense line.24
Lessons of defeat 
 The drawback to this method was that 
relied too heavily on heavy weapons, and tended to neglect the important role which 
infantry units played in conducting the final advance towards enemy positions. Because 
the Americans concentrated mainly on conducting a combined arms battle, and 
emphasized the use mechanized units while relegating foot soldiers to a secondary role, 
the IJA’s focus on infantry struck many observers as a backward and outdated practice. 
Only with proper combat experience, could the Americans formulate a more judicious 
calculation. 
The intelligence obtained from Southeast Asia during the opening stages of the conflict 
convinced the Americans that the IJA was capable of putting up an arduous challenge. 
Within a couple of months following the commencement of the Philippines invasion, 
military officials discarded virtually all signs of contempt. At the same time, the trauma 
of defeat gave rise to an exaggerated opinion of the enemy. After the supposedly inferior 
Japanese army ousted the Allies from Southeast Asia and the western Pacific, the 
Americans developed a stereotype which portrayed the Japanese as a superman, 
‘possessed of uncanny discipline and fighting spirit’. 25
                                                 
24 Drea, In the Service of the Emperor, pp.61-62, 72-73 
 The War Department’s 
intelligence service was not entirely responsible for propagating the so-called ‘supermen’ 
myth. On one hand, the military intelligence services in Washington emphasized how the 
IJA’s battlefield performance demonstrated a number of unique strengths, and 
assessments of the Japanese tended downplay their shortcomings. Yet, the situation was 
complicated because the War Department’s system for intelligence dissemination 
remained underdeveloped. As a result, military intelligence was unable to effectively 
25 Dower, War Without Mercy, p.9 
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communicate the lessons of defeat to officers at the battlefront. The inflated opinion of 
the Japanese emanated mainly from army commanders in the Far East, who witnessed 
their opponent at first hand. Reports from the battlefront showed a propensity to portray 
the IJA as a formidable opponent which had a number of decisive advantages over the 
Allies. Nevertheless, the setbacks in Southeast Asia did have a positive impact, in the 
sense that they led the Americans to take the first steps towards re-evaluating their 
adversary. Field commanders also realized that if the IJA was to be overcome, the 
training and efficiency of their own forces needed to undergo significant improvements. 
 
The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia commenced on 8 December 1941, and by 
March, the IJA secured Malaya and most of the islands in the Dutch East Indies. While 
Allied resistance was eliminated by spring 1942, Japanese operational planning showed a 
number of mistakes, especially in the Philippines. The most notable error was an 
underestimation of enemy opposition. A month after the invasion commenced, the high 
command revised its plans, and committed the larger part of its forces to the main 
objectives in the Dutch East Indies, thereby reducing the size of the invasion force. By 
early January, the bulk of American forces were confined to their enclave on the Bataan 
peninsula. General Homma expected to bring the operation ‘to an early and successful 
conclusion’.26  Yet, the rugged terrain and thick jungle vegetation did not permit easy 
movement. Without reinforcements, the IJA was faced with a prolonged campaign, 
against a resourceful army that ‘took full advantage of Japanese errors, miscalculations 
and over-confidence’. 27  Nevertheless, the fact that the attack on the Philippines was 
momentarily stalled seemed irrelevant to most Americans. 28
 
 As far as US military 
intelligence was concerned, the Japanese proved their capacity to inflict devastating 
losses, and Allied forces failed to halt the IJA.  
The War Department’s Military Intelligence Division went through a metamorphosis 
during the opening months of the conflict. In winter 1942, following the reorganization of 
                                                 
26 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p.218 
27 Willmott, Empires in the Balance, p.178 
28 R.H. Spector, The Eagle Against the Sun: the American war with Japan (NY: Vintage Books, 
1985), pp.138-39 
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the War Department, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) was established, under the 
direction of the assistant chief of staff, G-2.29
 
 The MIS was tasked to disseminate military 
information, while the MID remained responsible for collection and analysis, as well as 
formulating the operating policies of army intelligence. Finally in summer 1942, after 
becoming head of G-2, General George Strong decided that the MIS was to become the 
chief organization responsible for administering all intelligence activities.  
US analysts continued to demonstrate their familiarity with Japanese military practices. 
Nevertheless, their assessments were inclined to venerate the IJA, without paying due 
attention to the enemy’s faults. For example, the Far Eastern branch of the MID noted 
how that the IJA’s performance suggested that a ‘careful [and] meticulous training in all 
phases of the proposed operation [had] been given to each individual’, including 
rehearsals that simulated actual battle conditions. 30  Although the Japanese lacked 
initiative and imagination, their training was ‘complete and effective’. The IJA’s use of 
modern weapons was also knowledgeable. In particular, the establishment of air 
superiority was cited as one of the key reasons for success.31 The army air services’ 
tactics and equipment were sufficient for their intended purposes, namely the destruction 
of Allied airdromes and the provision of close support for ground troops.32
 
 Bombing was 
accurate, with pilots focusing on pre-determined objectives, on which data had been 
secured through intelligence. Although G-2 had held a respect for the IJA prior to the 
outbreak of the conflict, the emergence of visible proof that its forces were capable of 
defeating the Americans led army intelligence to make a more concerted effort to 
articulate its views.  
The MIS also ensured that the intelligence was regularly disseminated through channels 
                                                 
29 Naval War College, Newport, RI, Microfilm Collection, MF 218, US War Department, History 
of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941 to 2 September 1945, p.14 
30 RG 165, War Department, G-2 Regional File, Box 2130, File 6000, Far Eastern Branch, MID, 
The Japanese Army, 31 July 1942 
31 RG 313, Records of Naval Operating Forces, JICPOA, BLUE 644, Box 6, File A8/22c, MID 
Air Information Bulletin No.3, Timely Tactical Topics II, Undated ?? spring 1942 
32 RG 127, Records of the US Marine Corps, World War II Subject File, Box 25, G-2 section, 
General Headquarters US Army, Notes on the Japanese Army, 19 December 1942 
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such as its monthly bulletins, as well as a number of publications, including Tactical and 
Technical Trends, and Military Reports on the United Nations. The main problem with 
the setup was that army intelligence staffs in Washington were too removed from the 
front lines to provide a timely analysis of the lessons learned. Most often, several months 
lapsed before reports on the Philippines campaign appeared in MIS publications. Only in 
summer 1942, were US forces in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and the South 
Pacific able to rely on a theater-level organization which provided intelligence on the IJA 
performance. As a result, field commanders had only sporadic access to information on 
the initial encounters. The problem was compounded by the fact that the vast majority of 
officers in the Philippines ended up in captivity, and were unable to share their stories 
with newly-arrived troops. As late as July, following a tour of the SWPA, Major-General 
Richardson reported to MacArthur that officers in the 32nd and 41st infantry divisions 
were demanding information on the tactics which the Japanese employed at Bataan.33
 
 
The formulation of an accurate image was problematic because the US army’s 
intelligence machinery in the Far East fell into disarray during the opening months of the 
Pacific War. The information emanated from military observers in the Philippines, as 
well as field commanders who had engaged the IJA. A substantial amount of intelligence 
was also obtained from the British forces in Malaya, who were bearing a large brunt of 
the fighting. Although the material provided first-hand accounts of how the Japanese 
fared against Allied forces, the intelligence machinery did not function smoothly at the 
levels of analysis and dissemination. General Douglas MacArthur’s G-2 section was 
mainly concerned with quantitative data on the IJA’s strengths, dispositions and orders of 
battle. Military intelligence organizations in the Philippines did not have sufficient 
resources to process information on the enemy’s performance, and as a result, no formal 
means of communication existed whereby field commanders could propagate their 
observations.  
 
                                                 
33 MacArthur Memorial Library and Archive, Norfolk, VA, (MML), RG 29A, Papers of Richard J 
Marshall, Box 1, Folder 1, Letter from Major-General Robert C Richardson (US Army) to General 
MacArthur, 4 July 1942 
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US army officials in the Far East were thus left in a position whereby they had to 
formulate their own assessments of the IJA. The experiences of defeat provided the 
Americans with clear indications of the Japanese army’s prowess. In most cases, opinions 
of the Japanese showed trepidation. Military observers who had previously questioned 
whether the IJA was a competent force started conceding that the Allies faced a 
formidable opponent. Observations of Japanese landing operations showed that in this 
type of warfare, enemy forces operated proficiently. At Kota Baru on the Malay 
peninsula, the IJA faced heavy counterattacks.34 Yet, a sizeable amphibious force reached 
shore, under cover of darkness. The landing parties often chose unfortified beaches which 
the defending British forces had considered ‘unsuitable’, owing to the steep gradient and 
choppy tidewater. 35
 
 Rough weather was not an obstacle, and on the contrary, the 
Japanese deliberately chose such conditions in order to achieve surprise. Once ashore, 
inland advances were carried out rapidly, without concern for losses. 
The IJA’s performance on land raised similar levels of fear. Its success in Malaya was 
attributed to tactical skill. A US observer in Singapore noted how the Japanese showed 
‘great physical endurance and [an] ability to cross difficult terrain including streams, 
swamps and jungle’.36
 
 Enemy troops also demonstrated ingenuity, by skillfully using 
disguise and silent movement by night, and advancing via jungle paths and waterways to 
get behind the British defenses.  
In the Philippines, the IJA’s infantry arm also demonstrated its aptitude for conducting 
rapid advances. The Japanese army’s ability in the realm of major tactics was considered 
beyond doubt. Its troops were ‘excellently equipped’, and ‘trained with great 
                                                 
34 L. Barber, ‘Pearl Harbor Minus 95 Minutes: Japan's attack on Kota Baru’, in Army Quarterly 
and Defence Journal, Parts I and II, (1995), Volume 125, No.1, pp.5-14, and No.2, pp.138-49 
35 RG 313, Records of Naval Operating Forces, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas 
(JICPOA), BLUE 644, Box 5, File A8/22a, Headquarters, 4th Marines, Intelligence Summary for 
Period 8 December, 1941 to 1 February 1942, dated 4 February 1942; also see RG 127, Records of 
the US Marine Corps, World War II Subject File, Box 25, G-2 section, General Headquarters, US 
Army, Notes on the Japanese Army, 19 December 1941, and 19 February 1942  
36 RG 165, War Department, G-2 Regional File, Box 2146, File 6675, US Military Observer, 
Singapore, Japanese Tactics and Activities in northern Malaya, 28 December 1941 
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thoroughness in the hard school of war’ as a result of their experiences in China.37 Stealth 
and deception were noted characteristics of enemy tactics. Attacking forces were built up 
piecemeal so as to avoid detection. Small parties infiltrated the gaps in American 
defenses, remaining silent, and waited for reinforcements to arrive, until a sufficient force 
was developed to launch a small attack.38 Firecrackers were set off to confuse US troops 
over the actual location of the attacking force. In other instances, enemy forces withheld 
their fire with the view to leading the Americans to enter their positions, and then 
entrapping them with barrages from all directions.39 The IJA’s capabilities were also 
aided by a high level of aggressiveness within its rank and file. A report prepared by a 
former member of the US Military Attaché’s staff in Tokyo, based on Japanese 
commentaries, noted how the most important contributing factor was ‘the superb 
offensive spirit which permeates all of the armed forces of the Empire’.40
 
  
The Japanese also employed their weapons in an adroit manner. The invasion Southeast 
Asia was characterized by ‘mobility, great speed, and reliance on infantry weapons’, such 
as the machine gun and trench mortar. 41  Commanders did not expend their forces 
carelessly, and recognized how artillery, tanks and aircraft were necessary for softening 
Allied defenses and paving the way for the final assault. American personnel, who were 
often equipped with a limited number of hand grenades and 3-inch mortars with 
ammunition that contained a high proportion of duds, were overwhelmed by the IJA’s 
material superiority. One commander wrote, ‘it was only through maximum effort and 
determination that we were able to… defend [Bataan] as long as we did’.42
 
  
                                                 
37 RG 496, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), Box 281, Allied Land 
Forces SWPA, Intelligence Summary No.183, 26 June 1942 
38 RG 165, War Department, ‘P’ File, Box 2313, MIS, Tactical and Technical Trends, No.6, 
‘Japanese Tactics in the Philippines’, 27 August 1942 
39 RG 313, Records of Naval Operating Forces, JICPOA, BLUE 644, Box 5, File A8/22a, 
Headquarters, 4th Marines, Intelligence Summary for Period 2-20 February, 1942 
40 RG 226, OSS, Research and Analysis Branch Divisions, Intelligence Reports, Box 216, MIS 
Japanese Land Operations, December 8, 1941 to June 8, 1942, dated 18 November 1942 
41 RG 165, War Department, ‘P’ File, Box 886, Lieutenant-Colonel Warren J. Clear (GSC), Far 
Eastern Survey Report, 1942 
42 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp.288-89 
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Although the IJA demonstrated a number of shortcomings, in the aftermath of a 
devastating setback, US commanders were more likely to expect their opponent to 
remedy whatever faults it showed. For example, operations were often conducted without 
sufficient artillery and fire support. At Bataan, heavy artillery fire and armored attacks 
forced the 14th Army to halt its advance against the Orion-Bagac line.43 Nevertheless, the 
Japanese command persisted, and with the arrival of reinforcements, was able to regroup 
its forces for a second attempt. US forces, on the other hand, by this time were debilitated 
and demoralized, while their supplies were reaching the end of their tether. The most 
important lesson was that the IJA succeeded. Field artillery officers warned against 
assuming that the Japanese would ‘persist in using any system which [did] not produce 
the best results’, and suggested that improvements in their use of heavy weaponry were 
most likely.44
 
 While the opinion overlooked the IJA’s difficulties in adjusting its tactics, 
experiences in the Philippines had demonstrated its propensity to fight effectively. 
At the same time, military commanders began to develop a more realistic opinion of the 
challenges they faced. The development of an image which portrayed the Japanese as an 
invincible opponent was accompanied by a realization that the US Army’s methods 
needed improvement. Among the most pressing concerns was to prepare more effective 
defenses against the Japanese. During the withdrawal to Bataan, the assistant head of G-3, 
US Army Forces the Far East, noted that the defense lines had been hastily and 
inadequately manned, and ‘not a single position’ was ‘really occupied and organized’.45 
In order to ensure that their troops could hold out, army officers had to adopt more 
flexible methods. In  the Visayan islands, one commander abided by the traditional 
doctrine that called for defenses to be concentrated around main roads and positions.46
                                                 
43 Ibid., pp.336-46 
 
Against the Japanese army’s rapid movements, it was necessary to distribute troops and 
supplies in free flexible detachments, and yet, the idea seemed like ‘an abandonment of 
44 US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, (MHI), Field Artillery Journal, ‘Japanese 
Tactics’, Parts I and II, March-April 1942 
45 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p.188 
46 MHI, Papers of Bradford G Chynoweth, The Military Engineer, ‘Lessons from the Fall of the 
Philippines’, Volume XLVI, No.313, September-October 1954 
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the unity and control that had been drilled’ into most officers. 
 
US forces also needed to be acclimatized to fight the Japanese in the conditions that 
prevailed in the Pacific theaters. On one hand, the failure of the IJA’s offensive against 
the Orion-Bagac line made US troops confident in their own fighting abilities.47 During 
the lull in the action, commanders made strenuous efforts to impress upon their troops 
basic measures such as reconnaissance and patrolling.48 Fortifications were improved to 
provide wider fields of fire and better camouflage. Unfortunately, American forces 
succumbed to the artillery and aerial bombardment which enemy forces laid down when 
their operations recommenced.49
 
 The upshot of the encounter was that US forces had a 
significant way to go before they could operate efficiently. 
American troops were to be inculcated with the measures they needed to take in order to 
match their opponent’s efficiency. A War Department training manual, based on 
information obtained by American military observers from British officers in Malaya, 
warned that the failure to prepare troops for combat conditions in the jungle ‘will result in 
their being surprised both mentally and physically’.50 Likewise, the Japanese proved that 
properly trained troops could wrest the tactical initiative, provided they were prepared for 
the challenges. An infantry officer who served in the Philippines also noted how the 
morale of troops was unsatisfactory.51
                                                 
47 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp.350-51 
 Many US soldiers did not harbor the same hatred 
for the enemy as their Axis counterparts did, and consequently, many of them were killed 
or taken prisoner. Americans needed to undergo a ‘spiritual training’ along the lines of 
the Japanese, and develop a more aggressive attitude. By the middle of 1942, the lessons 
of defeat led US commanders to discard their pre-war conception, that their forces would 
prevail against the Japanese in all circumstances. Assessments of the US Army’s combat 
effectiveness vis-à-vis the IJA showed a growing awareness of the shortcomings which 
needed to be remedied. 
48 Ibid., pp.408-10 
49 Ibid., pp.418-19, 438-39 
50 MHI, War Department, Training Circular No.55: Notes on Jungle Warfare, 18 August 1942 
51 MHI, Infantry Journal, ‘Lessons of Bataan’, by Colonel Milton A. Hill, October 1942 
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Japanese martial qualities were not the only feature that required reassessment. Equally 
important was to gain a better knowledge regarding the characteristics of the enemy 
which the Americans were fighting, and to determine the underlying factors which 
influenced the IJA’s performance. Again, the situation was complicated because US 
officials had for a long time held stereotyped opinions of the Japanese. Their perceptions 
reflected a view held by Western intellectual circles for centuries, namely that Asian 
traditions and cultural values were at great variance with their western counterparts, 
almost to the point where they were inscrutable.52
 
 During the initial stages of the conflict, 
when the IJA appeared almost unbeatable, the Americans were more likely to focus on 
the ideological fervor which their enemy had demonstrated.  
The situation was further complicated because the Americans were engaging an 
unfamiliar opponent. Oftentimes, conclusions were based on myopic judgments, and the 
Americans tended to describe the Japanese as a barbaric race. Furthermore, the trauma of 
defeat gave rise to a hatred for the enemy, which in turn created an attitude of contempt. 
Army intelligence alleged that the Japanese were a people devoid of ethical principles. In 
April 1942, a bulletin issued by Western Defense Command and the 4th Army concluded 
that the Japanese ‘have no code of morals’, and were thus capable of an exceptional level 
of treachery.53 A former military attaché in Tokyo explained, ‘one can only understand 
the “bestial savagery” of the Japanese by a glance into their history’. 54
 
 Centuries of 
internecine warfare had rendered their country a battlefield, where it was accepted 
practice to sacrifice one’s life for the clan. Modern Japan was driven by a similar type of 
‘primeval stoicism’.  
Army intelligence did attempt to dismantle the ‘supermen’ and ‘primitive savage’ images. 
                                                 
52 Dower, War Without Mercy, pp.94-99 
53 RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office (AGO), World War II Operations Reports, 
Box 10078, File 337-2.17, Headquarters Western Defense Command and 4th Army (Office of the 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Presidio of San Francisco), Psychology of the Japanese Soldier, 27 
April 1942 
54 MHI, Infantry Journal, ‘Close-up of the Japanese Fighting Man’, by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Warren J. Clear, November 1942 
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Nevertheless, the MIS still harped on the fact that the enemy had a distinctive set of 
values. The Japanese had been educated to believe that their nation was destined to win 
the war, and when this belief proved to be false as their forces began to face defeat, 
enemy troops were more likely to commit suicide out of confusion and desperation.55 The 
opinion tended to put forward a one-sided view of the Japanese character. The intellectual 
qualities of the Japanese were also a target for criticism. Despite the proven capacity to 
carry out complicated operations, Japan’s cultural development was still directly 
imported from China, while technological advances were dependent on Western 
influence.56
 
 Imitation was one thus an ‘inherent characteristic’, and this rendered the 
Japanese to be lacking in any sense of creativity. 
Once the shock of the initial defeats subsided, army intelligence staffs formulated more 
rational opinions. A realistic understanding of the enemy was considered necessary if the 
US army establishment was to avoid developing distorted views, which in turn could lead 
to further setbacks. The Japanese were credited for having features aside from a blind 
fanaticism. In May 1942, the Advanced Echelon Headquarters at Honolulu issued a 
pamphlet, which noted how every move the IJA made in the war had ‘demonstrated long 
range planning and detailed study of the opponent [they] expected to fight’.57 Military 
intelligence also attempted to explain the features which influenced the Japanese soldier’s 
behavior. The Far Eastern branch issued a study which stated how morale and military 
spirit (seishin) were traditionally the foundations for the Japanese soldier’s training.58
                                                 
55 RG 127, Records of the US Marine Corps, World War II Subject File, Box 25, G-2 section, 
General Headquarters, US Army, Notes on the Japanese Army, 19 December 1941 
 
Seishin was ‘responsible for the superb offensive spirit with which the Japanese army has 
always been so strongly imbued’, and it stemmed from a strong belief in their ‘divine 
mission’. The Japanese were not ‘a race of imitators’, but had developed a way of 
56 RG 165, War Department, G-2 Regional File, Box 2052, File 2100, Board of Economic 
Warfare, Far Eastern Division, Japan’s Adoption of Western Technology: methods by which Japan 
acquired modern industrial techniques, Undated ?? spring 1942 
57 RG 313, Records of Naval Operating Forces, JICPOA, BLUE 644, Box 6, File A8/23, 
Advance Echelon Headquarters, (Honolulu), Intelligence Memorandum, Japanese Weapons and 
Tactics, 2 May 1942 
58 RG 165, War Department, G-2 Regional File, Box 2147, File 6675, Far Eastern Branch, MIS, 
Training in the Japanese Army, 30 September 1942 
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fighting that was based on their own experiences. Thus, by mid-1942, intelligence staffs 
made an earnest effort to properly gauge the IJA’s unique characteristics, and propagate a 
less prejudiced view. 
Limited victories in the Pacific, autumn 1942 to winter 1943: the myth 
of invincibility dismantled  
During late 1942 and winter 1943, Allied forces conducted a number of successful 
operations against the outer perimeter of Japan’s empire. The US Marine Corps, along 
with the 25th Infantry Division, halted the conquest of Guadalcanal in the Solomon 
Islands, which the Japanese had attempted to secure as a base for disrupting Allied 
shipping lines in the South Pacific. By February 1943, the remaining Japanese forces 
withdrew from the island. Meanwhile, in New Guinea, the US Army, in conjunction with 
the Australians, checked the IJA’s advance against Port Moresby, and prevented the 
Japanese from acquiring a base that could be used for an invasion of Australia. General 
MacArthur ordered an operation to secure the eastern portion of New Guinea, and in 
early January, enemy forces were ousted from their beachheads in the Buna-Gona area. 
The intelligence obtained through the encounters convinced both the MIS and its Marine 
Corps counterpart that the Japanese were not invincible as they previously appeared, and 
the IJA possessed shortcomings which adversely affected its fighting capabilities. The 
most notable fault was the shortage of modern weapons, and a lack of skill in their use. 
At the same time, intelligence staffs warned that the IJA was by no means an easy 
opponent. In offensive and defensive operations alike, the Japanese remained capable of 
inflicting substantial attrition and casualties.  
 
By summer 1942, the Americans established a more elaborate theater-level intelligence 
machinery in the Pacific. The intelligence arrived in three main forms. While combat 
action reports were the most important source, captured documents and POW 
interrogations became increasingly available as the campaigns progressed. Each zone of 
command, including the Central Pacific, South Pacific, and SWPA, had its own central 
intelligence organization. (see map) The Joint Intelligence Center (JICPOA), with its 
headquarters at Honolulu, was responsible for the Central Pacific. In the South Pacific, 
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the Combat Intelligence Center had jurisdiction over POW interrogations and captured 
documents, while the Headquarters of the US Army Forces (USAFISPA), based at 
Noumea, New Caledonia, processed reports on the IJA’s performance. Similar 
arrangements were set up in the SWPA. The Allied Translation and Interrogation Service 
(ATIS) was an inter-allied organization, comprised of intelligence officials from the US, 
Australia and Great Britain, although the former two were the overwhelmingly major 
actors. A similar set-up existed within Headquarters Allied Land Forces The Marine 
Corps also had their own organizations for processing information on the IJA, both at 
their headquarters in Washington and main Pacific base at San Diego. In the South 
Pacific theater, each marine division had its own intelligence section.  
 
The main problem with the intelligence effort in the Pacific theaters was that initially, the 
Americans did not have a great deal of material to formulate an accurate assessment. US 
forces had little experience in conducting offensive operations against the IJA, and most 
units entered combat without a full knowledge of the challenges they faced. Information 
bulletins produced by the MIS, as well as the theater-level intelligence organizations, 
contained little information on Japanese defensive methods until the final months of 1942. 
In any case, military personnel were often isolated from MIS publications, or reports of 
any type, mainly because the Allied transport system was overburdened with the 
shipment of supplies and ammunition. Marines at Guadalcanal received ‘no formal 
indoctrination’ on Japanese combat methods.59
 
  
The problem was further complicated because no formal means existed for sharing 
intelligence between the various theaters. The Navy and Army had ultimate control over 
specific areas, with the Navy in charge of the Central and South Pacific, and the Army 
commanding the SWPA. Inter-service rivalries prevented dissemination, and the War 
Department thus needed to remain as the clearing house for IJA-related intelligence. The 
arrangement caused delays in dissemination. 
 
Despite the problems, by the latter part of 1942, the Americans began to develop a 
                                                 
59 Bergerud, Touched with Fire, p.405 
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balanced understanding of the Japanese. The passage of time since the fall of the 
Philippines provided an opportunity to digest the lessons learned. The MIS showed a 
more objective opinion of why the Japanese managed to conquer Southeast Asia. The 
IJA’s early successes were attributable to the unprepared state of its enemies. Outflanking 
and infiltration movements were successful mainly because the Japanese ‘had the most 
troops and complete air superiority’.60
 
 Enemy forces also had not developed any ‘brand-
new tactics or new super weapons’, while their tactical methods were no different from 
those employed by other modern armies. For example, Japanese principles for infiltration 
movements were ‘practically the same’ as those set forth in the US Army’s basic manual 
on jungle warfare.  
Encounters against Japanese forces in the Solomons and New Guinea showed persuasive 
evidence that they could be beaten by properly equipped and trained troops. The IJA’s 
performance also started to reveal flaws that precluded it from fighting successfully. A  
noted weakness was the over-reliance on infantry, and an apparent inability to 
comprehend the destructive potential of modern firepower. In his report on the second 
phase of he Guadalcanal operation, General Vandegrift, commander of the 1st Marine 
Division, suggested that the IJA’s earlier successes had ‘induced a state of contempt for 
[the Allies’] capacity and willingness to fight’. During the attack on Henderson field, the 
Ichiki detachment made repeated assaults on positions defended by machine gun and 
barbed wire, and persisted even after entire units had been annihilated. The encounter 
demonstrated how enemy troops were ‘utterly incapable, intellectually or morally, of 
meeting the requirements of modern warfare’.61
                                                 
60 RG 165, War Department, ‘P’ File, Box 1203, MIS, Intelligence Bulletin, Volume 1, No.1, 
Part 2: Japan, Section 1: Ground Forces, September 1942 
 Army intelligence also concluded that 
Japanese forces performed poorly because they held flawed ideas on how to conduct 
warfare. JICPOA explained how the IJA tended to over-emphasize martial spirit and 
bravery. The philosophy was ‘the cause for the scorn which they [had] for [Allied] 
61 RG 496, General Headquarters, SWPA, Box 731, Division Commander’s Final Report on 
Guadalcanal Operation, Phase IV, (undated, ?? autumn 1942). For details of the encounter, see 
Miller, Guadalcanal, p.93; J. Costello, The Pacific War, 1941-1945 (NY: Rawson-Wade, 1981), 
pp.356-57 
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machines of war and fighting ability’. 62
 
 The belief of the infantry being ‘almighty’ 
proved incorrect in the South Pacific. Yet, the Japanese appeared to be at a loss for ways 
to remedy their faults. 
At the same time, the Americans were wary not to lapse into over-optimism, and 
acknowledged how Japanese forces still possessed certain characteristics that rendered 
them difficult to defeat. US troops in the Pacific continued to report that their enemy 
made good use of their infantry units and small arms. 63 Snipers caused anxieties for 
Allied soldiers, and whenever a field of fire existed, enemy troops climbed trees, 
sometimes remaining undetected for days. 64  As late as 1942, the MIS reiterated its 
contention that, owing to the durability of its infantry, the Japanese army was a ‘well-
organized, trained and equipped’ force.65
 
  
Although Allied forces managed to repel enemy offensives, the Japanese maintained a 
high level of dexterity. Speed and surprise continued to be key features. Troops were 
issued with detailed instructions to gain comprehensive information on their targets. At 
Guadalcanal, the plan of attack called for front-line infiltration units to undertake a full 
reconnaissance of enemy forces, and keep their activities and dispositions ‘under 
continuous observation’. 66 During their attacks against Australian positions along the 
Kokoda trail, the Japanese used feint shots and battle cries to compel the defenders to fire 
back and disclose their positions. Upon discovering a soft spot, the Japanese launched a 
series of continuous advances. Consequently, it was dangerous for the Allies to weaken 
the point of attack to reinforce other zones where Japanese troops had infiltrated.67
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Australians eventually found it impossible to make a stand because they were 
outnumbered and short on ammunition. At Milne Bay, Japanese scouts used the cover of 
vegetation to conceal their movements, and approached the Allied positions virtually 
undetected.68
 
  
Observers in the Solomon islands continued to stress the infiltration tactics which the 
Japanese used. On a number of occasions, enemy troops managed to cut off the US 
Marines’ outposts, and destroyed a large part of their equipment, while inflicting heavy 
casualties.69 Infiltration movements were ‘carried on so extensively’ that the Japanese 
were ‘able to outnumber enemy positions at will’.70
 
  
In spite of their shortage of fire support, the Japanese periodically effected a good degree 
of cooperation between their arms. During the attack on Sanananda in New Guinea, 
fighters came in just over the trees, dived towards the airdrome, and after machine 
gunning the grounded aircraft and anti-aircraft emplacements, flew in circles to observe 
the results of the attack.71
 
 
In defensive operations, the IJA put up significant obstacles. As was the case on the 
offensive, Japanese troops demonstrated their skill in screening their presence. Sergeant 
D.L. Golden, from the 164th infantry battalion at Guadalcanal, remarked that ‘Japanese 
camouflage was miles ahead’ of the Americans. 72
                                                 
68 UKNA, WO 208/2263, War Office, Weekly Intelligence Summary, (hereafter, WOWIS), 
No.183, ‘Extract from Report on Operations, Milne Bay, 24 August to 8 September 1942’ (Issued 
by Allied Land Headquarters, SWPA, dated 8 October 1942), 17 February 1943 
 US troops often did not notice a 
defense until they were within ten to fifteen yards, and the only warning was the 
appearance of enemy fire.  
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Japanese positions were constructed to hold out against attacks by forces with numerical 
and material superiority. Bunkers were designed to withstand the effects of heavy 
bombardment. At the Mount Austen area on Guadalcanal, the 25th infantry division 
found that mortar fire did little damage to enemy pill-boxes, while howitzers could 
achieve results only with a direct hit.73 At Buna, the Japanese displayed an energy in 
preparing their positions that was in ‘sharp contrast to the laziness and indifference of 
many of the small American units in constructing field fortifications’. 74  A series of 
mutually-supporting bunkers was constructed, connected by fire trenches that were ‘a 
constant source of trouble’. Local materials such as palm logs, dirt and sand were 
arranged in alternate layers, to give full protection against bombardment.75 Against such 
defenses, artillery, ordinary grenades, mortar fire and aerial attacks were ‘completely 
ineffective’.76 Enemy defenses also commanded wide fields of fire. One officer lamented, 
‘our troops were pinned down everywhere... It was dangerous to show even a finger from 
behind one’s cover, as it would immediately draw a burst of fire’.77 Extensive use was 
also made of the terrain in order to restrict the possible approaches. Positions were built 
on high ground, and as late as three days before the fall of Buna, General Robert 
Eichelberger, then commanding the I Corps, pondered, ‘even those few corridors which 
exist are narrowed by swamps and woods so that our maneuver is terrifically restricted’.78
 
  
Japanese troops also continued to show a high level of discipline. A War Department 
technical manual, issued in September 1942, described enemy morale as ‘excellent’.79
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The fighting abilities of Japanese troops were by no means seamless. One of the most 
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notable shortcomings which became apparent was a lack of initiative, and this often 
rendered troops unable to alter their methods when faced with the unexpected. General 
Vandegrift noted how ‘the Japanese soldier displayed tenacity and willingness to die on 
the spot, but no capacity to take independent action to redeem his situation’.80 Even when 
bayonet assaults and frontal counterattacks (Banzai charges) ended with the destruction 
of entire units, enemy forces adhered to their methods, and showed ‘the tendency to 
follow a set doctrine without the ability to readjust’.81
 
 
The adversities faced in combat also led to a deterioration in combat efficiency. Captured 
diaries revealed credible signs of demoralization when faced with the superior weight of 
Allied weapons. A unit at Lunga point in Guadalcanal lost faith in its ability to win the 
battle when it was attacked with artillery and aircraft.82 In New Guinea, a soldier whose 
unit was under constant attacks by B-17 Flying Fortresses lamented, ‘isn’t God protecting 
the Imperial army?’. 83  The Japanese were not the fearless fighters they had been 
portrayed to be, and when in adverse circumstances, they were ‘just as scared and 
downhearted as any other person’.84
 
  
Food shortages and the lack of medical supplies also had negative effects. At 
Guadalcanal, a soldier whose unit was on the verge of exhausting its rations explained 
how men were subsisting on green water grass and the sprouts of trees, with starvation 
and disease causing at least one casualty per day.85
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purifying tablets meant that soldiers had to drink contaminated water.86
 
 The turning tide 
of the war placed US intelligence in a better position to make an objective assessment of 
the IJA’s effectiveness. 
At the same time, due attention was paid to indications that Japanese troops continued to 
possess tenacity. A MIS bulletin issued in January 1943 explained how the IJA’s training 
was based on the theory that troops should be prepared to operate in undeveloped country 
without the advantages of motorized transport or heavy weaponry.87
‘I am glad to participate in this great mission as a Japanese. I am sure that the 
dawn of Greater East Asia is near. Morale is high and my belief in ultimate 
victory is firm. I shall never give in until the enemy is destroyed. [Our] country is 
God’s country and I am son of God, hence I shall fear nobody. I shall smilingly 
undertake this great mission. Long live the Emperor’.
  For this reason, 
soldiers were in a state of physical fitness at an early stage of their military education, 
and able to perform virtually all types of field maneuvers. Soldiers also showed an 
unquestioned loyalty to their nation’s cause, as revealed by an extract from a captured 
diary:  
88
 
 
The most significant indication of high morale among Japanese soldiers was their 
adamant refusal to lay down their arms, even when faced with impossible odds. The 
IJA’s code of practice dictated that to die in battle was the greatest honor, while to 
surrender was the ultimate disgrace. A lieutenant serving with the Inouye unit at 
Guadalcanal wrote in his diary, ‘if we do not succeed in the occupation of these islands, 
no one should expect to return alive to Japan’.89 Beleaguered troops preferred to commit 
suicide rather than allow themselves to be taken prisoner.90
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too sick or wounded to have any control over their fate.91
 
  
As the Allies captured their first handful of POWs, interrogations of captured soldiers 
provided further proof that they had been inculcated with the belief that surrender 
entailed dishonor. In fact, surrender was tabooed to the extent that the contingency was 
not recognized by Japanese military authorities.92 The majority of POWs stated that their 
greatest motivation for avoiding surrender was not their fear of betraying their Emperor 
and nation, but the danger that their families would be humiliated.93 Many POWs also 
feared social ostracization. A POW from Buna refused to let his family know his 
whereabouts, since that was ‘the greatest shame imaginable’. 94  Another prisoner 
expressed fears of facing court martial and execution. 95
 
 The evidence provided an 
example of the thinking that prevailed within the IJA, and highlighted the formidable 
obstacles that precluded larger numbers of Japanese troops surrendering. 
Thus, by the early part of 1943, the spate of limited victories against the IJA in the 
Solomons and New Guinea provided the US Army and Marine Corps with a better 
amount of intelligence with which to formulate a more complex view of the Japanese 
army than they had previously. Japanese forces showed that their shortage of modern 
weapons, and the lack of flexibility in tactical methods, had a number of negative effects 
on their performance. At the same time, encounters with the enemy continued to reveal 
that it had a visible level of tactical skill at hampering the Allied advance. Although their 
morale showed signs of faltering, Japanese soldiers clearly demonstrated that their 
willingness to keep fighting remained largely unbroken. The image of the Japanese was 
therefore one of an enemy who could be defeated, but with a substantial effort.  
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Implications for the development of tactical methods 
The initial counter-offensives against the IJA at Guadalcanal and New Guinea were often 
conducted with a vague idea of how enemy forces fought in defensive operations. 
Intelligence on Japanese fighting capabilities therefore did not influence the development 
of tactical doctrine during late 1942. On the contrary, the encounters enabled US forces to 
gain some badly needed information. Commanders in the US army and marine corps 
learned two important lessons concerning tactical doctrine. First, heavy armaments such 
as artillery, mortars, armor and close air support, were effective for overcoming Japanese 
forces that were insufficiently equipped. Second, and of equal importance, US infantry 
units needed perfect their methods in order to counter the Japanese soldier’s rapid 
movements in the jungle, as well as eliminate enemy troops who stubbornly continued to 
resist. By mid-1943, however, US army intelligence services were playing an active role 
in disseminating the tactical lessons learned from the preliminary victories against the 
IJA.  Action reports prepared by field commanders were regularly disseminated through 
intelligence publications, both in Washington and in the Pacific theaters.  
 
During the opening stages of the Pacific War, the effectiveness of US military doctrine 
remained untested. The influence of combat experience against the IJA needs to be 
examined against the wider background in which American tactical ideas developed prior 
to the conflict. Army doctrine tended to rely on technology and firepower. The 1941 
Field Service Regulations (FSR), while designating the infantry as the main arm, 
stipulated, ‘no one arm wins battles. The combined action of all arms and services is 
essential to success’. 96  Greater attention was paid to a war of movement, although 
emphasis was still on the attack and defense of organized positions.97
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was that the War Department made minimal efforts to integrate the combined arms 
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quite frequently failed to make the basic unifying decisions which would serve to 
coordinate the arms’.98 An army-wide training program did not exist until 1941.99
 
  
When the US army entered the war against Japan, its infantry force did not have an 
adequate number of skilled troops. At levels below the regiment, the bulk of the fighting 
was often carried out by a small number of riflemen. Although the Basic Field Manual: 
Jungle Warfare (FM 31-20) provided practical information on the matter, it did not 
anticipate situations where US forces needed to overcome enemy defenses.100 Although 
doctrine had stressed frequent movement and coordination of arms, US troops were not 
trained to carry out such moves. Major-General Edwin Harding, commanding the 32nd 
Division, recalled that his troops ‘had no opportunity to work through a systematic 
program for correcting deficiencies’. 101  GIs were hesitant to advance unless enemy 
defenses had been subjected to overwhelming bombardment. During the stalling of the 
Buna operation, G-3 inspectors reported to MacArthur that the soldiers preferred to kill 
enemy troops at a distance, or ‘have aircraft, mortars or artillery do the job for them’.102
  
  
The US Marine Corps faced similar problems. The majority of personnel passed through 
the officer-candidate school at Quantico, VA, where they received basic infantry training. 
However, for education on tactics, the marines depended upon the specialist schools run 
by the Army and Navy. Because the pre-war marine corps was a small institution that did 
not require a large number of technical specialists, it did not have an impetus for creating 
its own schooling system. 103
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inappropriately employed, and in organizational chaos’. 104
 
 Most of the marines who 
served during the war went into battle having mastered few skills for ground warfare 
operations, aside from firing a rifle, and they were forced to learn about tactical field 
maneuvers while in combat.  
When US forces began arriving in Australia during spring 1942, efforts to improve their 
efficiency were problematic, mainly because the majority of personnel were 
inexperienced. The 32nd Division was drawn from the National Guard, and substantial 
time was needed to absorb and train the draftees before the division could operate 
efficiently.105 In September 1942, after Eichelberger inspected the division, he informed 
MacArthur that its combat capabilities were ‘barely satisfactory’, and it was not 
sufficiently trained to fight the Japanese ‘on equal terms’.106 The main Allied objective 
until summer 1942 was to defend Australia, and plans for counter-offensives in New 
Guinea were not drawn until August. Consequently, the 32nd Division received no 
training for jungle warfare. A new program was introduced, where the main emphasis 
was on developing physical fitness and stamina. Soldiers also learned the techniques of 
scouting and patrolling. Even then, American troops in the Pacific struggled to figure out 
the rules of the task they faced, because ‘no one really knew how to fight’.107 The Buna 
campaign showed the extent to which American troops were not prepared for battle. Most 
units deployed with only five weeks of proper training. One soldier told Eichelberger that 
in twenty months of service, he had experienced only one night exercise, and asked how 
he could be expected to be proficient in night patrolling against the Japanese.108 Officers 
in the 32nd division learned about jungle fighting ‘the hard way’, and had ‘to write their 
own book’ on the lessons learned.109
 
  
Nevertheless, commanders in the Pacific theaters were well-placed to identify the 
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prerequisites for conducting successful operations against the IJA. American military 
traditions demanded that officers take a pragmatic view of the battlefield situation, and 
devise tactics that could defeat the enemy without incurring excessive losses. 110  US 
forces were also staffed by competent personnel. In the marine corps, most recruits had 
volunteered, and had a high degree of motivation. Many of them had worked on farms or 
in warehouses, and were familiar with physical labor, as well as the use of machinery, 
both of which proved essential when fighting in the Pacific theaters.111 Senior leaders 
proved to be ‘unusually good tacticians’. The US army had an efficient officer education 
system. At the Command and General Staff College in Ft. Leavenworth, KA, the 
curriculum was geared to prepare officers for the functions they needed to carry out at the 
all levels. Graduates were taught to ‘think, to analyze and to decide realistic courses of 
action’, and the US army was equipped with an officer corps who had the intellectual 
capacity to develop an effective set of methods.112 The main task facing field officers was 
to determine how the IJA fought, and thereafter apply the doctrine of combined arms in a 
manner that was suitable for defeating the enemy. In order to apply the lessons of 
encounters with the Japanese, the Americans used ‘the standard tools of military 
intelligence’.113
 
 Battlefield encounters with the Japanese were analyzed to discover what 
had gone wrong or right.  
Encounters in the Solomons and New Guinea showed that before US forces could fight 
with any prospect of success, one of the first steps was to build up a sufficient level of 
efficiency among infantry units. Soldiers had to be in good physical condition, and 
master the methods of executing small unit tactics. While US marines proved themselves 
superior to the Japanese in actual combat, their victory at Guadalcanal was by no means 
easy. General Vandegrift reported that the most notable shortcoming among his units was 
‘inadequate physical training’.114
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to march long distances through unfavorable terrain.115 From a logistical point of view, 
the launching of the North Africa landings meant that US forces could not receive 
reinforcements. In early December, following months of an extended campaign, there 
were no ‘experienced fresh troops’, with the majority of units succumbing to debilitation 
and battle weariness.116
 
  
In defensive operations, US forces needed to neutralize the Japanese by making use of 
their superior artillery fire. Officers from Guadalcanal agreed, almost unanimously, that 
heavy weapons, particularly the mortar, were ‘vital to defense’. 117  Because Japanese 
forces were capable of penetrating gaps as narrow as fifteen yards, it was ‘important to 
co-ordinate automatic weapons fire to cover the entire front of a defensive position’. 
Experiences at the Tenaru river and on Edson’s ridge engendered a confidence that 
marine rifle units in well-prepared positions and behind barbed wire obstacles could 
defeat Japanese attacks, even when heavily outnumbered.118
 
  
Infantry units also had to conduct an aggressive patrol of their environs, and eliminate 
enemy troops by engaging in close-range combat. Commenting on the successful 
attempts at repelling Japanese attacks on Henderson Field, the Third Marine Division 
opined, ‘a force in defense may considerably confuse and deter an outflanking force by 
ambushing them with patrols’.119 Emphasis was also placed on night training, and ‘up to 
50 percent of available training time [was to] be thus utilized’.120
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noisemakers to alert the defenders. 121  US servicemen also had to be persuaded to 
overcome their fears of enemy attacks. Major Ben Northbridge, commanding the 2nd 
battalion, 164th infantry regiment, remarked, ‘if I could train my men over again, I would 
put officers and men in slit trenches and drop bombs nearby to overcome fear’.122
 
 
In offensive operations, US forces needed to undertake a laborious and slow effort. While 
infantry units often spearheaded the advance, without proper fire support, they could not 
breach enemy perimeters without suffering heavy casualties. The use of artillery, tanks 
and tactical air units proved ‘as essential in jungle warfare as in open warfare’. 123 
Nevertheless, field commanders needed to gain sufficient experience before they could 
fully understand the value of heavy weaponry. Prior to the Solomons campaign, officers 
entertained doubts whether it was practical to employ 106mm guns in the jungle, owing 
to their lack of mobility.124 Encounters at Guadalcanal quickly proved that the weapons 
had ‘a definite place in future operations’. The initial attack on Buna failed because 
troops were not provided with weapons that could defeat Japanese bunkers.125 Tanks had 
not been brought to the forward lines, and the Americans carried out the attack with only 
one howitzer, with insufficient reserves of ammunition. 126 The operation proved that 
artillery was useful in reducing Japanese bunkers, and thereafter, all infantry units were 
provided with high-caliber guns. Close air support was also a valuable weapon, especially 
in areas where the terrain consisted of tall mountains and deep gorges.127
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positions.  
 
At the same time, infantry units had to develop effective techniques of advancing against 
the IJA’s lines and mop up the remnants of its opposition. Aerial bombing and gunfire 
were not effective in some situations, especially when the Japanese fortified themselves 
in natural features such as caves, as they did at Gavutu and Tanambogo. 128 Nor did 
bombardment work on gun emplacements unless the bombs and high explosive shells 
landed directly, as ‘a lucky hit’. In order to ensure that enemy defenses were properly 
neutralized, infantry units had to physically occupy the ground. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Carlson, from Second Marine raider battalion, suggested that attacks be carried out 
against the rear and flanks of Japanese positions, so that the defenders could be taken by 
surprise.129 All divisions at Guadalcanal agreed that the campaign taught how soldiers 
needed to operate independently in small units, since the rugged terrain did not permit the 
movement of massed forces.130 US troops also needed to overcome their enemies by 
using light infantry weapons such as the hand grenade. 131
 
 Success depended upon 
individual soldiers and NCOs acting ‘promptly and intelligently when confronted with a 
situation’.  
Encounters in New Guinea offered similar lessons. Infantry units were initially trained 
only for frontal attacks, which proved costly. 132 Eichelberger solved the problem by 
replacing the leadership, including General Harding, and devising a plan whereby patrols 
were to scout enemy territory, and to call in mortar fire upon discovering a bunker.133 
While the arrival of tanks enabled the attackers to take the initiative,134
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made only by ‘killing and digging out the Japanese occupying each bunker’, a task that 
entailed ‘a slow, tedious and difficult process’. 135  The operations ‘conclusively’ 
demonstrated that US forces needed to undertake a more ‘detailed, extended, and 
thorough training of the individual soldier and the squad, section and platoon leaders’. 
Frontal attacks were to be avoided, and Japanese operations had shown that attacks from 
the flank and rear provided ‘the best opportunity for success’.136
 
 
Because supporting arms and infantry units had important roles to carry out, close 
cooperation was essential. The War Department noted how even in units commanded by 
competent officers, a common mistake was to neglect setting up a definite arrangement 
between air and ground units for mutual support, which often resulted in an 
‘ineffectiveness of both’.137 One of the areas where close coordination proved essential 
was in tank operations. At Guadalcanal, tanks were effective in breaking through 
Japanese defenses, but they had to operate ‘at slow speed and with extremely close 
infantry support’ so that they could be adequately protected against enemy anti-tank 
parties.138 At Cape Endaiadere and Giropa Point, when tanks were not protected by foot 
soldiers, they were exposed to Molotov cocktails, hand-placed anti-tank mines and 
enemy personnel jumping onboard with anti-tank bombs.139
 
 At Sanananda, the Japanese 
proved ‘astonishingly accurate in his anti-tank small arms fire’. Against such an opponent, 
tanks needed sufficient armament and armor to enable them to ‘close with the enemy’.  
Infantry units needed a proper knowledge of the battles they were fighting. A meticulous 
surveillance was essential to gain accurate intelligence on enemy positions. The main 
problem was that, owing to the IJA’s skill in concealing its positions and the movement 
of its troops under thick jungle vegetation, aerial reconnaissance was not entirely reliable. 
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In the Solomons, information on Japanese troop strengths was patchy, and ‘all too 
frequently wrong’, showing either an exaggeration or underestimation.140 Nor did the 
marines have good maps of the island, and the deficiency was ‘never remedied 
throughout the campaign’.141 Prior to the Buna operation, General Charles Willoughby, 
head of MacArthur’s G-2, calculated that, owing to its previous losses, the IJA only had 
1,500 defending troops, when the actual figure was over fivefold.142
 
  
Attacking forces therefore had to obtain the information through their own efforts, 
without relying excessively on their intelligence units. A constant reconnaissance was 
necessary in order to stay updated on the enemy situation. At Guadalcanal, the junior 
officers and NCOs were not experienced, and Vandegrift criticized the initial failure of 
all units to patrol their fronts and flanks properly.143 As the campaign progressed, marine 
patrols learned to work as a team, whereby two members conducted a scout, while the 
third remained hidden and kept a lookout for enemy movements.144 Officers noted how 
the development of small unit tactics, at the squad and platoon level, was essential in 
order to develop the necessary methods for reconnoitering.145 Patrols needed to observe 
Japanese positions for extended periods, ‘stalking’ them, and await for moments when 
enemy troops emerged to prepare food or carry out construction work.146 In order to 
operate effectively, patrols needed complete details of the terrain. During the approach to 
Buna, the 128th regiment had little topographical intelligence. 147
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a proper reconnaissance of enemy dispositions and replacements. Front-line troops often 
had ‘no trustworthy knowledge of Japanese positions’, and the information was not 
obtained until actual attacks were conducted.148
 
  
By the early part of 1943, US ground forces in the Pacific theaters gained a competent 
knowledge of the measures they needed to undertake. The army and marine corps 
succeeding in taking the initial steps towards applying their doctrine of combined arms 
operations in practice, and adapting them to meet the challenges posed by the IJA. The 
G-3 report on the Buna campaign concluded that the operation did not reveal any new 
principles of warfare; however, the nature of the terrain and the enemy dispositions 
‘necessitated some novel applications of well known principles’.149
 
  
The main task facing US forces was to disseminate the lessons of their initial victories. 
The acquisition of a better knowledge of how to defeat Japanese meant that intelligence 
publications on the IJA army began to include a substantial amount of material on the 
subject. Large amounts of fire power were likely to prove effective in reducing enemy 
defenses. At the same time, field artillery units needed to synchronize their fire so that 
advancing the infantry could be covered. At Guadalcanal, guns were ‘highly effective in 
destroying stubborn enemy resistance’, mainly because liaison officers provided 
intelligence that aided the adjustment of artillery so they could hit smaller targets such as 
machine guns, mortars, and dug-in pockets of resistance. 150 The most salient lesson, 
nevertheless, was that US forces could not rely on any set procedures, and ingenuity was 
essential. Officers in the 1st Amphibious Corps suggested that enemy forces should be 
countered by using some of their methods, such as booby traps and the ambushing of 
trails.151
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death, and the manner in which he conducted operations without concern for losses, 
could play into the hands of American troops, so long as they were properly trained, and 
inducted with a confidence in their ‘superior ability to outthink, outshoot and outfight’ 
their opponent.152 Infantry units also devised ad hoc ways to for reduce enemy defenses. 
A marine officer noted how, in situations where the Japanese took cover in dugouts and 
offered prolonged resistance, a bucket of gasoline thrown into the entrance, followed by a 
hand grenade to ignite an explosion, ‘generally produced results’. 153
 
 Against larger 
dugouts, where attacking parties were shot as they entered the tunnels, recourse was had 
to using ‘sufficient dynamite at the tunnel entrance to partially cave it in’. When the air 
inside got bad, the Japanese often emerged.  
More importantly, the lessons needed to be integrated into a theater-wide system for 
training, so that army and marine corps personnel could prepare for the challenges they 
faced. Jens Doe, who commanded the 1st infantry battalion at Sanananda, asserted that all 
units needed to use reports on enemy tactics to ‘the fullest extent’, so that training could 
take place with a realistic simulation of battlefield conditions. 154  Yet, inter-service 
rivalries continued to hinder the sharing of lessons between the South Pacific and SWPA. 
For example, the US Army’s lessons from Buna did not circulate to the marines in the 
Solomons. The Navy did not have a clear idea of the difficulties which Japanese defenses 
could pose, and deployed two untested National Guard divisions at New Georgia.155
 
 The 
landing party’s casualties were higher than the 32nd division’s losses at Buna.  
Top military commanders in the Pacific theaters also continued to voice concerns that US 
forces had yet to achieve an adequate level of efficiency. The difficulties faced in 
neutralizing Japanese resistance convinced Eichelberger that all units heading to the front 
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needed to undergo an extensive training program.156 Yet, shortly after Buna, General 
George Kenney, MacArthur’s chief of air staff, opined that troops engaging in the Papuan 
campaign were not trained in close-range combat, because ‘the school books haven’t 
been teaching this game’.157 Unfortunately, the problem persisted until the later stages of 
the campaign, mainly because the large influx of new arrivals, coupled with the need to 
deploy troops to the front at short notice, placed a strain on the system. The Headquarters 
of the US Army Forces in the South Pacific even stipulated, ‘training will be so 
conducted as not to interfere with the tactical mission of any unit’. 158 The situation 
caused periodic problems. For example, following the Bougainville campaign, the 37th 
Division recommended, ‘training in scouting and patrolling and ground reconnaissance 
should be more detailed and thorough’.159
Conclusion 
 Nevertheless, as the Pacific War progressed, 
both the army and marines corps learned how to develop the necessary methods for 
defeating the IJA. The encounters at Guadalcanal and Buna provided the first 
opportunities for the Americans to test their doctrines against the Japanese. While the 
initial counter-offensives in the Pacific theaters were not conducted with a full knowledge 
of Japanese tactics on the defense, the situation improved as a result of combat 
experience. Encounters with the enemy showed US forces the weaknesses they need to 
remedy, as well as the strengths that contributed to their success.  
The evolution of US intelligence assessments during the opening stages of the Pacific 
War demonstrated how the Americans needed to fight the IJA in order to determine its 
fighting capabilities and the countermeasures necessary to defeat it. Prior to outbreak of 
hostilities in December 1941, the Americans did not have a reliable basis for making a 
realistic assessment. The IJA’s problems in winning its war in China gave rise to the 
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conclusion that it did not have the resources necessary to wage war against an Allied 
coalition. Under the circumstances, the Japanese had yet to prove their capacity to defeat 
their western rivals in combat, and the Americans were unlikely to see any reason to be 
alarmed over the IJA’s prowess. 
 
The IJA’s success in eliminating Allied military power from Southeast Asia during the 
early part of 1942, and the speed with which the Japanese conducted their operations,  
gave rise to the contention that US forces were confronting an enemy with superior 
martial qualities. Oftentimes, intelligence staffs, as well as military personnel, tended to 
exaggerate the IJA’s capabilities, and credited it with a level of skill which it did not 
actually possess. The successes achieved by the marine corps and army in overcoming 
Japanese forces at Guadalcanal and New Guinea during late 1942 and the early part of 
1943 enabled the Americans to develop a more realistic view. The main lesson drawn 
from the Allies’ initial counter-offensives in the Pacific was that the IJA’s combat 
capabilities were by no means superior, and its main weakness was a shortage of modern 
equipment, coupled with inadequate methods of their use. When faced by properly 
trained and equipped troops, the Japanese could be defeated. At the same time, the 
Japanese continued to demonstrate their capacity to put up a significant challenge. In 
offensive operations, enemy forces were adept at using surprise and mobility to out-
maneuver the Allies. When defending its positions, the IJA demonstrated a visible level 
of skill at constructing positions that could withstand the effects of heavy bombardment, 
while its troops were prone to fight to the last man and round. Owing to their capacity to 
inflict delay and attrition on the Allies, the US army and marine corps continued to view 
the Japanese as a difficult opponent that could be overcome only with a substantial 
commitment of time and resources. The main effect of the intelligence obtained through 
the initial encounters with the IJA during 1942 and early 1943 was to introduce American 
military personnel to the challenges they were to face during their land campaigns in the 
Pacific theaters. 
 
The information which the Americans gained on the Japanese army during the opening 
stages of the Pacific War also had an impact on the development of the tactical doctrine. 
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The setbacks in the Philippines exposed a number of weaknesses which had to be 
remedied. Field commanders and soldiers alike were over-reliant on heavy armaments, 
which gave rise to a situation whereby infantry units did not have the skill to counter the 
Japanese soldier’s rapid movements and to neutralize enemy defenses. The counter-
offensives in the Pacific theaters during late 1942 were conducted with a vague idea of 
the challenges posed by the IJA’s defensive tactics, and military personnel did not have 
substantial knowledge on the counter-measures they needed to adopt. The most important 
lesson to emerge was that US forces had to be prepared to undertake a laborious and slow 
effort if they were to overcome the Japanese. Because the IJA’s defenses were built with 
a considerable level of resilience, adequate amounts of fire support had to be brought to 
bear in order to neutralize them. At the same time, the Japanese soldier’s tendency to 
continue fighting until he was killed meant that foot soldiers were needed to physically 
occupy the positions and to clean up the remnants of enemy resistance. While the 
Americans had yet to perfect their methods of fighting the Japanese, their initial spate of 
limited victories enabled the US army and marine corps to gain a sufficient base of 
knowledge on the tactics they needed to develop. Thus, by the early part of 1943, US 
military personnel in the Pacific theaters had the combat experience they needed not only 
to formulate a realistic image of their opponent’s combat capabilities, but also to develop 
the tactical methods that were necessary for defeating Japanese forces on the battlefield. 
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